Civilian-Military Alliance for Reforms in Society

Jose B. Comendador, 2006, PMA ’59; Brig Gen AFP (ret)

Background

Historically, people relied on the military to hasten changes in political leadership, but once achieved, they mistrust the military’s involvement as partner, or, guardian in a comprehensive change process

Everything was left to the ‘experts’ and ‘experienced’ in governance, but for decades, people got nothing beyond recycled faces of leaders with ever-changing political make-ups & colors. Meanwhile, the raid on public coffers continue no end. The country got worse each time.

This continued alienation of the military from active participation for reforms in society had led those in power to open richly adorned “revolving doors” for some carefully chosen generals from out of the seniority ‘deep’ to turn against the people and suppress freedoms just to maintain selfish political & economic power.

In the span of 20 years since the 1986 EDSA 1 revolution to date, this country has had twelve (12) major political turbulence / military unrests (an average of one recurring every 1.8 years) where the military had always been looked upon as a “sway vote.”

(1) 22-25 February 1986 – EDSA 1 People Power Revolution resulting to the ouster of President Ferdinand. The rest is history followed by more attempts at change of leaderships.

(2)   06-07 July 1986 – The Manila Hotel Takeover (Failed, bloodless, but destructive, with 500 rebel soldiers and 5,000 Marcos loyalists involved)

(3)  23-24 Nov. 1986 – God Save the Queen (Failed, bloodless, but came close to shooting in Camp Aguinaldo, 3 other military camps and the Batasang Pambansa, with a complete Cabinet revamp as a result)

(4) 27-28 Jan. 1987 – Assault on GMA-7 TV Station (Failed, bloody, destructive, but casualties were minimized by the use of teargas against the rebels)

(5)  18-19 Apr. 1987 – Black Saturday Enlisted Men’s Revolt (Failed, bloody, but limited to Philippine Army Headquarters)

(6)  09-13 July 1987 – Manila International Airport Takeover Plot (Pre-empted, bloodless, engineered by pro-Marcos politicians and foreigners involving the airlifting from abroad of vast amounts of weapons and ammunition good for 3 months’ operations)

(7) 28 Aug. 1987 – Takeover/Burning of GHQ AFP (Failed, very bloody, with armed clashes in 8 major areas: Malacañang; Camp Aguinaldo; PTV4/Camelot Hotel; Broadcast City; Villamor Air Base; Camp Olivas, Pampanga; RECOM 7 HQ, Cebu; and Legazpi City Airport)

(8)  29 Nov. – 09 Dec 1989 – Takeover of the Makati Commercial District and Mactan Air Base (Failed, extremely bloody with 99 dead and 570 wounded, mainly civilians, with 3,000 rebel troops under 7 Generals, 21 Colonels and 441 other officers which attacked 9 major military installations, including bombing raids on Malacañang and Camp Crame)

(9)  1st Week, Oct. 1990 – Creation of the Federal Republic of Mindanao (Failed, bloody, and ranged throughout 4 provinces in Northern Mindanao, with a pseudo-government and officials put in place and the participation of hill-tribe guerrillas)

(10)  04-05 Mar. 1991 – Takeover of Cagayan Province (Failed, bloody, including the death of an AFP General, led by the incumbent Governor of Cagayan who had organized his own private army)

(11)  27 July 2003 - Oakwood Mutiny by the ‘Magdalo’ soldiers composed of some 300 officers and men (Failed)

(12) 24 February 2006 – Alleged planned withdrawal of support to GMA by elite forces of the AFP’s First Scout Ranger Regiment; the Philippine Marines; and the PNP’s Special Action Force (Nipped before any actual movement of troops)

It’s about time!…

The military seriously assess the realities of this new conflict environment that usually led to fratricidal wars and finally put a stop to these recurring events that are more debilitating to the country than all existing threat groups combined.

The people set aside biases / objectively review /assess to improve on the past one-shot civilian-military alliances to broaden working relationship to include instituting / sustaining meaningful, lasting reforms in society, spanning social, economic, political dimensions. 

The past twelve (12) political upheavals should not be looked down and dismissed merely as “military adventurism”, or, “power grab by misguided elements in the military”. The root causes go beyond simple military concerns on morale and welfare. Societal concerns of centuries-old apathy and neglect that date back to the time of revolutionaries Andres Bonifacio, etc. must be looked into. For as long as these deep-rooted concerns are not resolved by our society, there will always be idealists in the military who will emerge until the desired reforms are in place and hunger and poverty will have been reduced or eradicated from the Philippine landscape.

Objectives:

·        To initiate and sustain meaningful reforms in society

·        To neutralize resistance to reforms in society

Universal Role of the Military as Stabilizer of Societies

The homogenous, hierarchical military has proven to be a “most stable society within a society” all over the world. Its organizational structure seem to have been time-locked not due to incapacities for change but mainly because the demands for quick responses to fleeting battle situations have never changed. The rigidity of the chain-of-command concept is imperative to this day that even communication had to be drastically reduced to simple but accurate, brief and concise language of operative brevity codes that can be quickly, clearly and readily understood amidst the din of gunfire. Hand signals even suffice to automatically initiate series of actions predetermined and exercised in mock battles. This is the environment the military has moved about for ages: missions well-defined and understood; assigned tasks clearly spelled out for coordinated action; timeframes set; options arrayed before being unleashed to achieve nothing less than the desired results, at all costs! This is not always true in political crises that usually led to fratricidal conflict situations where the people involved are not enemies of the state. These two cases in point that actually occurred should explain why:

Situation 1: EDSA 1 revolution, Feb 1986

“Immediately dispatch the four tora-toras fully armed. Level Camp Crame headquarters; destroy all seven helicopters and the PTV channel 4 antenna!”

 “Sir, I can easily dispatch the four T-28s but I cannot assure you where the pilots will drop their bombs after take-off – whether on your targets, or, on you. They better stay on the ground.”

Situation 2: Mactan Siege, Dec 1989

 “Dispatch the four F-5s to hit rebel positions in Camp Aguinaldo; Villamor Air Base and Sangley Point.”

  “I have declared in strongest terms my support for the rebels, put life and career on the chopping block, but it does not mean I should run amok.“

  “Don’t attack or we blow them up at the first note of gunfire!”

Blind obedience to the above orders direct from the top which were actually issued would have killed a lot of people. History would have been different. The air force commander denied use of air power to both opposing forces and stood by that decision to the end.

Ties that Bind

An unspoken military society exists not by choice but by time–honored traditions upheld for many ages. Men come and go but still the military continues to remember, honor and salute its long line of fallen comrades and surviving elderly generations of seniors.

The traditional military salute, no matter how variedly executed by all armies of the world, universally conveys but one unspoken message, that of respect – even among uniformed strangers, friend or foe – across a negotiations table - its sincerity measured by the snap put into it. This silent bonding process had for ages contributed to the stability of many ‘societies within societies’ all over the world. The military salute to honor their dead even long after their last taps have been sounded.

Crises bring out the ‘bests’ and the ‘worsts’ in men. The ties that bind them become sturdier than most because they put their ‘bests’ together, consciously safeguard own weaknesses and collectively use combined strengths to overcome a crisis. That is how unity in diversity to survive a crisis really means. That’s why camaraderie forged in battlefront conditions endures more than any other.

Retirees have put in a lifetime for the flag, scarred by crises past, like it or not, become part of a traditional society of true warriors who carry on an unwritten code of honor demanded at the time that bound them to survive. They have touched the threshold limits of human endurance no ordinary mortals have – a strength that silently provides a society to make a difference during any lesser crisis. They have been a rich source/well-spring of knowledge and experience not everyone had that have been tapped in the formulation of war policies and strategies relevant and responsive to ever-changing security environments. It would be a mistake for anyone to assume that ties among men molded in the crucibles of war get severed once they bow out of the service.

This explains why the military everywhere, as expounded by Carl von Clausewitz in his book, “On War”, had proven to be the stabilizer of society because they are organized precisely for crises situations. They can move in unison with speed, undaunted and focused to achieve a clear-cut mission, at all costs. They cannot be any less - it could mean their lives.

In the Philippines, as elsewhere, there is no other society within its society that can match the effectiveness of the military organization to manage change despite so much powerful resistance. All groups that come out during political crisis situations have their respective agenda that unity among them becomes quite a struggle before it is finally attained. Meantime that internal squabbles are being settled, the evil forces are given time and space to build up counter-forces to resist change. The military’s role in this case would be very appropriate.

Proposed Joint strategy:

 “Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop”

 The time-tested AFP counter-insurgency campaign strategy is comprehensive, doable and effective. Its implementation is brought down to a manageable level - the community or barangay, where specific problems are identified and acted upon immediately.

The strategy requires close coordination between the civilian and the military but could get snagged at the “Develop” phase. Resources to support the initiatives are subjected to many variables.

The strategy, with a strengthened, more responsive, well-coordinated “Develop” phase would be vital in the management of comprehensive and meaningful changes / reforms in society.

The following tabulates some proposed tasks / actions the alliance could do together in each phase to institute reforms in society more effectively:

Strategy / Objectives / Immediate Priority Actions

A.  Clear

To ensure good governance; continuity & smooth operation of government functions and services;

1 Professionalize; cleanse all departments of scalawags

2 Install most senior CESO-qualified as department head

3 Set up a clearing house to preclude unjust removals

4 Neutralize all resistance to reforms

B.  Hold

To maintain and secure the state's territorial integrity; to project  state presence, power & influence over its people in all its territory.

1 Keep all barangays under control

2 Assist L/G executives; suspend or purge, as required

3 Maintain peace and order

4 Establish a community defense ' security plan

5 Organize Community Welfare & Development Council

C.  Consolidate

To harmonize efforts in achieving the priority program targets  within timeframes set by the Sagip Pinoy master plan;

1 Establish and maintain a smooth operating environment

conducive to socio-economic development efforts

2 Organize & set up for the immediate conduct of national

elections for the desired credible government

D.  Develop

To maintain, support, enhance, secure and sustain the gains

achieved in Phases A, B & C above:

1 Phase 1:  Human resource development to address urgent,

immediate concerns - poverty, hunger, unemployment;

financial crisis

2 Phase 2:  Community development for self-reliance

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Points of Convergence for  Unity & Focus on a National Agenda

 …to Rebuild lives; Restore dignities

Jose B. Comendador, 2006, PMA ’59; Brig Gen AFP (ret)

Background

Our Nation is in serious crisis. People are clamoring for meaningful change. Various opposition groups are one with the people in wanting to dislodge GMA. But, who takes over if they succeed appears to be a much bigger problem among them than ousting GMA. Six (6) options are now the subjects of raging public debates, further fragmenting the nation, as follows:

1)      Reinstatement of deposed President Joseph Estrada

2)      Civilian-Military Council as Caretaker / Transition   Government

3)      Constitutional Succession, VP Noli De Castro, or, Sen. Franklin Drilon

4)      Snap elections

5)      Military take-over to head a martial law regime

6)   Maintain status quo, which means, do nothing

We are on the brink of another fratricidal conflict no different from previous ones we have had for the last 20 years since 1986, (average of one occurring every 1.7 years) and sadly, for the same reasons – corruption, plunder; political patronage, ‘transaction politics’, etc. The people’s economic lives never got any better, in fact, even got worse after each change of leadership in the past. The consuming issue of who takes over is taking its heavy toll on the people.

The nation is bursting at its seams with rage. Yes, the people are outraged and suffering but they are not pouring into the streets. They hear the same sound bytes from their leaders like taped replays of past recordings. The debates/ investigations in Congress as responses to the crises are too distant from the gut issues the people are most concerned with. What their leaders are doing are perceived to be irrelevant to their lives for now. They see nothing coming to improve their lives within any foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, hunger and poverty stalk our land and a looming economic meltdown is staring everyone in the face. People have lost faith in government (-38% public trust rating, considered among the lowest ratings of a government in the world); they do not believe in glowing promises. The people see no hope for deliverance from the economic crisis by a cash-strapped government that “paid out more in debts than loans it acquired;” with an “unsustainable debt service” equivalent to 70% of government expenditure, in order to catch up with a runaway national debt that eats up “78.7% of total economic output” – considered “among the highest levels in the world.” At the ground level, this means non-payment of COLAs; retirement pensions and benefits of many government employees for some three years now.

This seeming quiet is deceiving. We dread the day when critical mobs of drugged, food rioters spill out into the streets of Metro Manila. There are about 1.6 million hungry adults (aged 15 & above) in the NCR; about 1.8 million in adjacent Region 4 and some 1.2 million in nearby Region 3, or, a total of 4.6 million hungry people who hardly eat one meal a day, like forces-in-being in place in “battlegrounds” immediately surrounding the seat of central government, poised to take to the streets in desperate moves for survival. This is a threat to national stability more serious than all threat groups combined

‘Spearhead Targets’

Our country will never have peace, progress and stability unless the afore-cited three vital issues are immediately resolved decisively, with topmost priority, focus and finality within the short to medium term. Focus on these three issues will resolve most, if not all, other problems consequently only as a secondary matter of course, hence are of strategic import.

Ø    Injustice

Install soonest a Credible Leader with resolute political will to restore the Rule of Law and the People’s Sovereignty and lead this nation out of a looming economic meltdown.

Ø    Hunger & Poverty

Implement a Comprehensive Economic Survival & Recovery Program, ‘Sagip Pinoy’ that can immediately eradicate hunger and poverty to economically uplift 12.8 million households, 70% of national total, within 3 to 5 years, to avert a growing social unrest, while firmly setting up in earnest a sturdy structure against;

Ø     Recurring Political Crises & Poll Cheating

Through a set of Political and Electoral Reforms to finally put an end to recurring political upheavals/ bloody fratricidal conflicts (at one every 2.5 years); and to completely destroy/replace a well-entrenched ‘cheating machinery’ to pave the way for the immediate conduct of an honest, clean and orderly referendum/ national elections; to restore political stability under a new paradigm of governance anchored on a truly credible government and the sovereign will of the Filipino people, through a people-based election system, briefly described as follows:

Constituents elect not only a barangay captain who will also be a people’s ‘trustee’ (in its strict sense) to represent their vote in both local and national elections, referendums or plebescites on the pros or cons of local or national issues of vital concern.

Mr. Ramon A. Pedrosa, in his paper, “A New and Ancient Philippine Political Grammar,” in a nutshell, describes the mechanics as follows:

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“For example, if the election of the President of the Philippines were to be done by 42,000 Barangay Executives, instead of at large by 40 million registered voters, consider the advantages from the point of view of instant review available to the Barangay constituencies all over the country.

The Executive would obtain the details of his mandate for selection from the Barangay population itself in a local referendum called for the purpose in said Barangay. This would bring democracy directly to the basic Barangay level.

The manner of compliance by the Executive with that mandate, whether in the casting of the Barangay's vote for a particular candidate, or voting pro or con on an issue, is subject to the scrutiny of the entire Barangay. He is subject to the penal provisions of the Election and Penal Codes. He can be removed or recalled for infidelity to the trust of the people – and prosecuted under the Code of Crimes -immediately, and not at the next elections.

Political Democracy will now be a reality.”

The Sagip Pinoy Movement

Is a private sector crusade aimed to inform / educate the people how organized savings mobilization as a people’s collective initiative can help themselves not only survive and recover from hunger and poverty, but also help turn the country’s economy around.

It is willing to share and work in collaborative efforts with other organizations who may wish to adopt similar advocacies to confront the challenges “beyond the need to replace the person at the top”; to preclude recurring situations where “the streets become a regular location for political action” …where “the Rule of Law was set aside and the Rule of Force prevailed”…”mob rule”…“that lead to constitutionally questionable successions, it becomes a subversion of democracy”…“a defeat for due process.”

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Proposed Reforms in the AFP, PNP and the Civil Service

For a More Professional, People-Orented Government Service

Brig. Gen. Jose B. Comendador, June 6, 2005 / Apil 2, 2006

Purpose:

This paper proposes to insulate not only the AFP, but also the PNP and the Civil Service from politics in order to redirect the orientation of government service back towards the people.

Background

Our country has experienced fast turnovers of AFP Chiefs of Staff and PNP Directors, as well as, Cabinet/Department Secretaries for many reasons we are all aware of recently – politics dominating all other factors.

The “supremacy-at- all-times-of-civilian-authority-over-the-military” clause cannot be invoked on the PNP – an integral part of civilian authority. Would this tacitly imply “supremacy of the civilian authority (with the police - its armed component) over the military, as well? Recent graduates of the PNP Academy were told, you have been authorized to hold guns, “yours is not to question nor reason why; yours is but to do and die”. ”…Why is it that the Commission on Appointments does not also require “to insulate the police from partisan politics”…is it not also “the state’s duty to strengthen the patriotic duty and nationalist consciousness and the professionalism of the AFP” …and of the PNP, as well? Why this strong bias only against the military?

We must stop the corrosive practice of appointing cabinet members from the private sector who get appointed and given a lot of authority without the corresponding responsibility; whose tenure is co-terminus with the appointing power.  Because of this short uncertain tenure in office, we often hear the popular rationale that “we serve at the pleasure of the president” creating a “catch-as-much-can” attitude while in the service. In more ways than one, they have contributed to the problem rather than assist in good governance and some have even brazenly raided the public treasury. Examples: ‘Outsiders’ Garci, Bolante, Lorenzo, etc fooled and put 84.2 million Filipinos to shame and look helpless internationally. The people, have become victims of a recurring immoral hit-and-run operating system and, sadly, no one admits responsibility for the mess these ‘outsiders’ have put this country into!

Do away with ‘outsiders’ put into the bureaucracy to lord over the civil servants who are better qualified and knowledgeable about the job. Should a need for special skills and expertise arise and there’s justifiably none available in government, that should be the only time ‘outsiders’ can be taken in, but only as consultants for that particular area where his expertise is needed for a specific period and reappointed only if justified as necessary.

Problem: There’s a need to insulate the AFP/PNP and the civilian bureaucracy from politics.

Objective: To have a more professional, service-to-people-oriented military, police and civilian bureaucracy

Facts Related to the Problem:

Recent Development

1.   Reference: The Daily Tribune, Sunday, 02 April 2006 which reported the following: AFPC/S proposed “to exempt lower-ranked officials from facing the Commission on Appointments for their appointment or confirmation of their promotion”…” to approve only the appointment or confirmation of those from colonel to general”…”to preclude an early stage for politicians to influence military officers or their proteges”

2.   C/A vice-chairman Pichay reacted to the proposal saying, Senga “should shut up because he is only betraying either his fascistic tendencies or ignorance of one of the bedrock principles” of the Constitution, then followed this up with an impressive citing of several articles and sections of the !987 Constitution about, among others, the “supremacy at all times of civilian authority over the military”…”that the military should be insulated from partisan politics”… “that it is the state’s duty to strengthen the AFP patriotic duty and nationalist consciousness and the professionalism of the AFP”…and added “the AFP chief cannot emasculate the commission just to suit the whims of some AFP officers who are afraid to face the confirmation process.”

The AFP Promotion System

Is a long, continuous screening process that spans from a soldier’s (O or EM) entry into the service up to the time he retires.

1.      After basic training, the soldier undergoes mandatory education/ up-grade training at various stages of his military career which are required to qualify for promotion to the next higher rank/grade. His performance in schools become part of his service records.

2.      Appropriate orders cover all duty assignments and is evaluated in his performance of these duties, also reflected in performance evaluation reports, copies of which are attached to his service records.

3.      After about 20-25 years in various duty assignments on the job; series of up-grade education/ training; annual performance evaluations, the screening process starts to become even more meticulous as the pyramid tapers off and becomes narrower; the need for lateral attrition becomes imperative; competition among peers/ classmates become more intense, the lieutenant colonel is advised to ‘tip-toe’ - ever careful not to cross the paths of any member of the powerful Commission on Appointments for confirmation of his promotion to full colonel, then again, if he makes it further upwards for promotion to the subsequent star ranks and positions of responsibility. It is at this point that the tentacles of politics bear heavily on the AFP.

PNP Promotion System

The PNP is a uniformed armed civilian agency of government. The PNP promotion system may be similar to the AFP system, but the senior officers do not go through the Commission on Appointments for confirmation of their promotion, or, appointments. The “supremacy-at- all-times-of-civilian-authority-over-the-military” clause cannot be invoked on the PNP – an integral part of civilian authority. Would this tacitly imply “supremacy of the civilian authority (with its armed component – the police) over the military, as well? The recent graduates of the PNP Academy were told, you have been authorized to hold guns, “yours is not to question nor reason why; yours is but to do and die”. ”…Why is it that the Commission on Appointments does not also require “to insulate the police from partisan politics”…is it not also “the state’s duty to strengthen the patriotic duty and nationalist consciousness and the professionalism of the AFP” and of the PNP, as well? Why this strong bias only against the military?

Comments/ Observations

Proposed Reforms to Insulate the AFP/ PNP and the Civil Service from Politics, such as, but not limited to the following:

To Insulate from Politics, the AFP/PNP

Do away with AFP promotions passing through the Commission on Appointments. Promotions to the next higher ranks from Lt. Colonel upwards and to limit confirmation by the Commission on Appointments only of senior officers considered for appointments to sensitive command positions of responsibility, such as the major service commanders and deputies up to the Chief of Staff, and must be based essentially on merits strengthened by the following established strict criteria that can be drawn from individual service records:

a)     Educational attainment

b)     Performance in field duties

c)     Medals, awards and decorations received

d)      Other outstanding / meritorious accomplishments officially recognized by competent authorities / institutions – military, civilian, foreign, etc.;

e)     Demonstrated sterling leadership qualities, strength of character and strong potentials for higher positions

f)       Individual overall profile reflected in the annual Officer Evaluation Reports and the Soldier’s Performance Ratings.

..and the Civil Service/

For a truly professional civil service, a similar set criteria and seniority lineal roster in each department must also be maintained by the bureaucracy / civilian agencies of government so that cabinet secretaries and other agency heads will only come from the departments who will be selected based on similar criteria and performance ratings, more or less. Do away with ‘outsiders’ put into the bureacracy to lord over the civil servants who are better qualified and knowledgeable about the job. Should a need for special skills and expertise arise and there’s justifiably none available in government, that should be the only time ‘outsiders’ can be taken in, but only as consultants for that particular area where his expertise is needed for a specific period and reappointed only if justified as necessary.

Leadership Aptitude Rating System

Had been in existence in the AFP for as long as I can remember throughout my 36 years in the service since PMA days. Essentially, the Academy concept of rating one’s peers, upperclassmen and tactical officers and lowerclassmen established, among other performance criteria, the ranking of a cadet in the seniority list within each class in the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines. Academic performance determined on graduation his initial seniority in the lineal roster of the AFP regular force, which may change for meritorious promotions, if not, demotions for cause.

Both the AFP officer (non-PMA’ers included) and the enlisted man undergo evaluation and performance ratings throughout their active military service, which form part of respective service records. These ratings, among other AFP-set promotion criteria, count a lot during consideration for promotion to the next higher rank by the Promotions Board and finally, the Board of Generals – a continuing screening process, only to be negated and devastated at the Commission on Appointments level which consequently erode faith in the ratings system, because all one needs to have is political connections to get to the top, diverting the soldier from his constitutional duty to protect the people and the state to protecting the politicians in power. – the sad results of which we are experiencing today.

Although the enlisted men do not go through the Commission on Appointments, their actions are highly influenced through the chain of command by senior officers playing politics. That is how politics permeate down to the lowest ranks. Politically-favored senior officers who walk the corridors of power and often seen in the cocktail circuits with the high and the mighty are given choice positions / commands only when they are about to be promoted just to comply with a criterion that require, among others, an officer must have held a major command position to qualify for promotion. This practice had raffled feelings of other more senior officers who have been out in the combat areas for most of their career.

For Good Government

It is a fact that in both the armed services (AFP/PNP) and the civilian agencies, all rank and file employees undergo rigid entry prerequisites, in-service training and pass thru mandatory upgrade schooling / training as they gain experience and rise in ranks through the years, as a general rule, through merit and results of performance ratings. Why still put in ‘outsiders’ mainly for political reasons/ paybacks. Why should the political factor override professionalism in government service to meet the needs for good governance. Political power?…but good governance enhances and strengthens political power. Hence, good governance is good politics. Pure politics does not necessarily bring about good governance. Achieving good governance must be the more dominant objective in appointing cabinet secretaries.

We must stop this corrosive practice of appointing just anybody who in more ways than one have caused more problems than good in government and raids in our public treasury. Examples: Untouchable ‘outsiders’ Garci, Bolante, Lorenzo, etc were appointed and given a lot of authority without responsibility. Result: they fooled and put 84.2 million Filipinos to shame and look helpless internationally. The people, have become victims of a recurring immoral hit-and-run operating system and, sadly, no one admits responsibility for the mess these ‘outsiders’ have put this country into!

The people, in collaborative efforts with the military, police and civil servants must initiate and demand these specific reforms. Also demand appointees to top positions in civilian government to voluntarily and irrevocably resign to give way to deserving leaders and CESO-qualified civil servants. There had been no reported disruption in the functioning of the departments suddenly left by the Hyatt 10 – because there are professionals in the department who can run them even without the ‘outsiders.’

Comments/ Observations on Recent Developments

The AFP Chief of Staff, Gen Generoso Senga is right in taking steps to lessen the base of politicking among the senior officers. It was uncalled for and distasteful of an honorable congressman to over-react to the reform proposal by calling Gen Senga names and branding him ignorant of the law. Senga proposed “to exempt lower-ranked officials from facing the Commission on Appointments for their appointment or confirmation of their promotion.”

Senga’s proposal will only lessen the number to be confirmed, but definitely will not diminish the supremacy of civilian authority over the military, and the congressman need not worry about “if the Commission had not been created, who else would determine if military officers are qualified to their appointive posts” because this function is not being removed from the Commission on Appointments. Besides, long before an officer gets to the Appointments body, he will have undergone years of screening and the AFP will have identified those qualified through the Promotion Boards and the Board of Generals, rendering the C/A’s confirmation function purely ministerial.

Congressman Pichay and his group will not determine who will qualify; they will only choose who would best qualify from among those pre-determined and presented qualified by the Board of Generals who have considered all factors and years of service of the officer under consideration. For the C/A to assume that function of determining who qualifies would be encroaching deeply into the function of the Board of Generals and would be counter-productive. That would not insulate but instead worsen politicization of the AFP.

Section 22K of the National Defense Act of 1935 allows the AFP to send one half of one percent of its officer corps to civilian, or, military post-graduate schools. The AFP also requires that candidates for promotion to full colonel and the star rank must have completed a master degree education from any civilian school, or, its equivalent in military schools. Many officers have taken up post-graduate studies in various fields – business management; law; public administration and advance technical sciences. In all these educational endeavors, the officers had also been taught how to do environmental analyses, or, to scan the strategic environment which span the social, political and economic dimensions of any problem situation. In short, the AFP officer corps of today have been having the “proper education and orientation” over the years, long before Mr. Pichay became congressman, and in fact, by that continuing education and training process, the AFP officers have been awakened on what good governance is all about and have learned exactly what to do with bad leadership.

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