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Senga's Swan Song
Lito Banayo
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Details of the Military Report of the
Feb. 24 Plot
Dona Pazzibugan, Inquirer
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Lead the Coup
Glenda Gloria, Newsbreak
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The February "Coup d'Etat" and the
Left's Alliance with the Militay
Sonny Melencio
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Romancing the Military
Miriam Grace A, Go, Aries Rufo, Carmela Fonbuena,
Newsbreak
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Chronicle of the July
and February Days in Manila
Sonny Melencio
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Coup de Main, Coup d'Etat or Coup de Theatre
Patrick Patino
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War Games
Glenda Gloria,
Newsbreak
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Intrigues, Kindness, Rock Music
Wear Down Madalo Detainees
Fe Zamora
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They Are Not Criminals
Ramon Farolan
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No Way To Treat
An Officer
Ninez Cacho-Olivares
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The Magdalo Apology
Alejandro Lichauco
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Negotiation with the Magdalo
Max Soliven
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Coup VirusThrived in Flawed
Democacy
Amado Doronilla
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The Negotiation with the Magdalo
Max Soliven
 A
couple of my friends in the foreign diplomatic corps have expressed concern
to me over what they discreetly termed the "lenient treatment" given 181
soldiers convicted of participating in the July 27, 2003 failed coup, known
as the "Oakwood Mutiny" having been released after two years in military
detention. In sum, the diplomats feared that the Philippines being too
"soft" on rebellious soldiers and mutineers would only encourage future coup
d’etat attempts.
I agree with this assessment, but there’s a special background to the case
which I can now reveal, my having been one of the negotiators who convinced
the 296 mutineers to surrender, and diffuse the explosives they had set in
one of the most important sectors of Makati’s financial district, that July
27th two years ago.
I was the only non-government member of the negotiating panel which went
into the barricaded Oakwood Hotel building (at the Glorietta) that
afternoon. I had gone there because the rebel officers had specifically
asked to talk to me, and had requested me to convince the President to delay
the assault by government troops, artillery, armor on the barricaded
building.
When I arrived in the area, under military escort, my cellphone had rung. It
was the President calling. "Don’t attack yet, Mrs. President," I told her.
"I’m going into Oakwood now."
There were other remarks, but they’re not for publication. She concluded
with, "I hope you can talk some sense into those young men."
She confirmed that she had reset the deadline for attack to 7 p.m. "For
Chrissakes, Mrs. President," I exclaimed, glancing at my watch, "it’s
already 6 p.m. and I’m just going in this very minute."
The mutineers sent one of their officers, a captain in civvies (t-shirt and
shorts) and a uniformed sergeant to guide me in through the minefield they
had laid from the Shoemart (SM) corner to Oakwood, and all over Rustans,
Glorietta, the parking lot, and next-door Inter-Continental Hotel.
The government panel which arrived, too, was headed by former Armed Forces
of Staff, General (now Ambassador) Roy Cimatu. He became our Chief
Negotiator, and I must say he and all our "team", if I may say so, did a
good job – the best way we could.
I assure you, those 296 officers and men – silly in retrospect it might seem
their rash enterprise was – all of them veterans of combat, many with battle
decorations, were prepared to fight and die. That’s what we concluded from
what we saw during the four hours we "negotiated" to them. Negotiation
consists mainly on listening to their gripes and feeling out their anger –
then offering them an alternative.
Believe me, if they fought, it would have been a bloody shambles, the entire
area would have been razed to rubble, and we would have been gazing at those
ruins for the next three or more years. (And we nervous negotiators, as Roy
Cimatu afterwards admitted, would have been in bits and pieces, too, having
stayed there way beyond the attack deadline). But at least the putschists
agreed to a "back to barracks" formula, provided they were tried "under the
Articles of War." Meaning, of course, court martial.
The coup leaders, Trillanes, Gambala, Maestrecampo, Alejano and Layug, asked
for clemency for the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers in their
group, and we promised them that. However, we said they would still have to
go through military trial. That promise has been fulfilled with the release
of the 181 soldiers.
What has not been fulfilled – and is a doublecross (as I’ve already written)
on the part of the government – is the pledge that the mutineers would be
tried only under the "articles of war," not in a civilian court.
I’m certain the more senior officers and the leaders of the "Magdalo" Mutiny
won’t get off the hook so readily – and will be meted out harsher punishment
than the 181. But in effect we also promised them that they would get a
break.
Did we negotiate "with a gun to our heads" as some critics stupidly say? You
bet. We weren’t afraid for ourselves – you get to a point when you say,
"What the hell, if it’s Dying Day for us, then, God help us, but so be it."
We were afraid they would blow up one-fifth of downtown Makati, and our
country’s reputation to boot. That’s all.
I offer no apologies for the deal we made. I ask our government to honor it,
though, in its entirety.
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Coup Virus Thrived in Flawed Democracy
Amado Doronilla, Inquirer, September 27, 2004
THE HISTORY of military coups in the Philippines from 1986 up
to 2003 is strewn with the wrecks of failed rebellions. The apology of the
six leaders of the Oakwood mutiny is but the latest testimony to the glaring
lesson that coups have failed to gain the acceptance of the Filipino people
as a method for political change.
There can be nothing more wrong or complacent than to interpret the apology
as an affirmation of the resilience to Philippine democracy or the
commitment of the Filipino people to it.
On the contrary, the climb-down of the Oakwood mutineers does not mark the
end of the trail of coup-making in this country.
Coups, in the context of Philippine political culture, are a function of
weak governments and have festered on the faults of and frustrations over
Philippine democracy. Military adventurism should not be written off as a
result of the Oakwood fiasco. Its virus remains alive in the bloodstream of
a flawed democracy and a corrupt political system, and is likely to flare up
again when the system is weakened.
Since July 1986, barely five months after the installation of the "people
power" administration of President Corazon Aquino, there have been no less
than 10 coup attempts, at least six of which posed grave threats to
democratic governments.
When we speak of coups we refer only to overt rebellions, excluding military
interventions in political stalemates, such as the withdrawal of military
support for the Joseph Estrada administration -- which was, in reality, a
bloodless coup that led to the collapse of his regime.
The best that can be said about the survival of governments against these
repeated rebellions is that while the people did not flock behind the banner
of the rebels, they did not, at the same time, demonstrate their commitment
to die for democracy by marching in the streets to defend a beleaguered
government.
For example, when the Aquino administration was in danger of being toppled
by the "God Save the Queen" (November 1986) coup and by the December 1989
revolt, the bloodiest of the series, most Filipinos stood on the sidelines
as seemingly noncommitted bystanders, waiting for the outcome and hedging
their bets.
As has been commented by some well-informed observers, the Oakwood
mutineers' apology was the result of a combination of factors.
The apology was motivated by what was described by Navy Lieutenant Senior
Grade Antonio Trillanes IV's lawyer as a "convergence of interests." By this
he meant considerations of lost income while the rebels underwent
court-martial, and reinstatement in military service.
Climate for compromise
Essentially, the climate for a pragmatic and face-saving compromise for both
the government and the rebels had emerged. Negotiations had been under way
for a compromise since last December. Philippine Military Academy alumni
played a back-channel role in the negotiations, using the PMA old-boy
network as a conflict-solving mechanism.
The new leadership in the defense department after the June 30 inauguration
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was seen by the rebels as a sign of a
new approach in cleaning up alleged corruption in supplies procurement in
the Armed Forces and a favorable climate for working out a compromise.
Besides, persons who were involved in previous inquiries into coups, like
Prof. Carolina Hernandez of the University of the Philippines, whose
impartiality was trusted, were brought into the negotiations.
Divided over amnesty
The President has accepted the apology as "humbly made," but said the
court-martial would go ahead. The rebels did not demand amnesty as a
condition for the apology.
But taking into consideration the nuances of reconciliation in Philippine
culture, amnesty after a decision of guilty of mutiny in a court-martial
cannot be ruled out.
The rebels' lawyer has pointed out: "It is to the best interest of the
Arroyo administration to see to it that the mutineers are back in the
mainstream, and it would be best for Trillanes and company [for] their men
to be out of jail. It's also for the national interest that we have
stability."
Debate in Manila over the question of amnesty is divided between the
hardline view and the pragmatic view. The hardliners argue that the "full
force of the law" should be applied to deter future mutinies.
The pragmatists argue that a compromise enhances the climate of political
calm -- a condition essential to political stability and certainty for
business.
The apology contains some revealing statements that might shed light on the
issue of why the Oakwood mutiny failed and why previous rebellions had
failed.
No popular support
The statement said that mutineers occupied Oakwood on July 27, 2003, "to
vent our grievances." It said, "This we did in our honest, though naïve,
desire for change."
What is revealing is the statement of the mutineers that "as succeeding
events have shown, the Filipino people did not agree with our means of
expression. As a result, we humbly face the consequences of our action."
There's nothing naïve in their "desire for change," but the mutineers
betrayed naivety when they thought that their grievances over corruption in
the military, which undermined the campaign against the Moro separatist
rebellion in Mindanao, would galvanize mass support in Metro Manila for the
Oakwood seizure.
As seized military documents have demonstrated, the coup was not
well-planned and, worse, was based on false assumptions and unrealistic
expectation.
The plan of the mutineers revealed that they had been assured that as soon
as they had attacked Oakwood, this would be the signal for mobs composed of
Estrada supporters to stage mass demonstrations in Makati to support the
siege. The mobs never showed up.
Lessons from the past
The lesson the mutineers have learned is expressed by their statement that,
"succeeding events have shown [that] the Filipino people did not agree with
our means of expression."
In their impatience and romantic notions about their action, the mutineers
ignored the lessons of the failure of the coups led by Col. Gregorio Honasan.
Honasan's coups assumed they would receive popular support, unlikely at a
time when the Aquino administration was enjoying wide popularity.
The explanation of why the Aquino administration survived the Honasan coups
and why the first Macapagal-Arroyo administration survived the Oakwood siege
lies outside the realm of Filipino popular support in the streets.
These coup attempts failed mainly because the balance of power inside the
military itself tilted in favor of government.
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