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Game of the Generals
Gladstone Cuarteros
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Proposed
Reforms in the AFP and PNP
Brig. Gen. Jose Comendador
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Abolishing the Marines
Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
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Mistrusting Our
Elite Forces
Romy Lim
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Two Marine Officers Quit
Sunstar
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Salute to the New
Randy David
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Soldiers Are People Too
Joel Rocamora
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Military Radicalism
in Venezuela: How Relevant to Other Developing Worlds
Walden Bello
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Inevitability of a
Coup
Alejandro Lichauco
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The
President is the Biggest Threat to Military Discipline
Juan dela Cruz
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What's With the Armed Forces?
Rene Jarque
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Reinventing the
Philippine Military
Bobby M. Reyes
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The Philippines Needs
a Constructive
Armed Forces
Rene Jarque
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Reforming the Armed Forces
Rene Jarque
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AFP Generals and
Officers Engaged in
2004 Poll Fraud
YOUNG
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Operation Gloria
Aries Rufo
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Soldiers in Election:
From Pawns to Knights?
Rene Jarque
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The Filipino Soldier
Sec. Eduardo Ermita
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Reforming the Armed Forces
Capt. Rene Jarque
Introduction
The Magdalo Group siege of Oakwood the weekend of 26-27 July has once again
brought forth the festering issue of unprofessionalism and corruption in the
Armed Forces. The grievances they proclaimed shows that the AFP has not
really changed much in 17 years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution--that reform
movements undertaken in the past have seemingly not made a dent in changing
the AFP, that changes have been merely cosmetic and merely rhetoric. As they
say in propaganda work, “a lie told a thousand times becomes the truth?and
one of the biggest lie is that the Armed Forces has been reformed. Sure,
uniforms have changed and a few facilities have been constructed such an AFP
Theater and a Generals?Lounge but meaningful changes that really promote
professionalism, uplift morale and welfare and use resource efficiently have
not occurred. The Magdalo Group mutiny, removed of its political colors, I
believe is merely a manifestation of the continuing frustration of the
soldiers with their officers and of the officers with the chain of command.
In this presentation, I will share my answers to four simple yet key
questions about military reform, answers that may be far more complicated
than the questions:
1) Is there a need for reform in the Armed Forces?
2) What should be the areas for reform?
3) Is reforming the military possible?
4) Who are responsible for military reform?
Is there a need for reform in the Armed Forces?
Yes, there definitely is. The signposts of unprofessionalism and corruption
are everywhere in the AFP, from the sergeant who sells combat boots, to the
major who gets a kickback from purchases, from the lieutenant who accepts
bribes from illegal loggers to the general who converts unit funds for
personal purposes, from the sergeant who hides his incompetence through a
padrino to the colonel who seeks promotion by palakasan or sipsipan. Every
officer or enlisted personnel who receives an allowance aside from his basic
salary is indirectly guilty of corruption as he or she tolerates a practice,
which is both unethical and illegal, the practice of conversion. Poor
hospitals and medical facilities, poor maintenance of buildings and
equipment, cramped housing for soldiers, unflyable planes and unsailable
vessels, no first aids to soldiers in the field, lack of ammunition ?all
these point to something inherently wrong with the state of the AFP and
points to a need for reform. It is not merely a question of funds, it is
also a question of leadership and management, or the lack of it.
At present, the Armed Forces can be likened to a crumbling, old house that
is tattered everywhere with its foundations weak and crumbling. No amount of
repainting and re-plastering of the walls or repairing the creaking floor
will make it stronger as the pillars and foundations are weak. It may look
ornate and pretty on the outside but the paint merely hides the rot in the
wooden panels. It may still be standing but termites are crawling everywhere
eating away the beams and pillars. What is required is a total overhaul such
that, in the end, it is still a house with stronger structural foundations
and perhaps, of an entirely different design.
With so many reform programs in the AFP since EDSA 1, one would ask, isn’t
the AFP reformed yet? Yes, the reform process has been going on for many
years and tremendous strides have been gained in civil-military relations,
human rights, training and strategic thinking. But in terms of the overall
professionalism of the Officer Corps and in financial and logistics
management, a lot still needs to be done. The fundamental problems and the
reasons behind them have not been addressed and no real, honest to goodness
reform has occurred. The AFP may have lost its omnipotence during martial
law but many practices that made it an unprofessional and tainted
organization during that period remain. In fact, many of the unethical
practices have been institutionalized and remain untouched.
Since my resignation in 1998, I have continued to keep in touch with
officers and enlisted personnel and have kept abreast of the situation in
the Armed Forces. Today, I am still under the impression that not much has
changed and that in fact, there are many opinions saying that the AFP has
regressed instead of improving. In my talks with officers and soldiers, I
get this feeling of hopelessness in the Armed Forces. These discussions
indicate that martial law era practices still thrive and my readings show
that succeeding administrations and AFP chain of command after Marcos have
only made surface changes and genuine, profound reforms have not happened
yet. All the talk about professionalism and integrity today, if impressive
to the civilian, is in fact, hollow in the hearts and minds of the soldiers.
Short term appointments to top positions, officers with questionable
character and competence in top posts, bad leadership practices, corruption
and unethical conduct ?which have prevailed all these years ?all these the
soldiers are aware of but they cannot do anything about it for the generals
will squash dissent and the soldiers are afraid to lose their jobs.
Perhaps, I am being naive, too idealistic and even, stupid but to me, more
than any other public servant, the soldier should practice the utmost
professionalism, discipline and integrity. The officers have taken an oath
to serve the country and people and the present state of the AFP fails to
live up to that oath. It bothers me that the generals and senior officers
are unable to act accordingly on their oath and build a credible and
professional Armed Forces, despite knowing what is wrong.
This is a serious case of the lack of integrity and professionalism. And
what hypocrisy to declare themselves as professional and honorable. If
people only know the truth. Indeed, I feel saddened by the notion that the
present state of the AFP does not bring honor and dignity to the thousands
of soldiers who have died in service of the nation, that my friends and
comrades have died needlessly, not to preserve freedom but rather to make
the politicians and generals rich and happy. As Captain Maestrocampo
rightfully asks “Saan ang kabuluhan ng pagkapatay ng mga sundalo?”
In my resignation letter to then Secretary of National Defense Orlando
Mercado in 1998, I wrote candidly and perhaps, foolishly:
Sir…I want to leave because I feel that I am beginning to lose my
self-esteem, my self-respect and my sense of integrity in an organization
that I believe is unprofessional and corrupt. I have always believed that
being an officer is a noble vocation ?that officers follow the professional
military ethic and treat each other professionally. But what I have seen are
officers, especially many generals, who take advantage of the system for
selfish and unethical purposes and undercut each other for promotions and
assignments. I always thought that being an officer is a public trust ?that
an officer does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do. But what I
have seen are officers, including Peemayers, who would not hesitate to lie
to advance themselves or do anomalous business transactions, who cheat the
taxpayers of their money and who even reward unethical conduct.”Becoming a
general is no longer an exciting prospect for me considering the kind of
officers being promoted to general rank. The only thing consistent about
them is the inconsistency of the standards which I find unacceptable and
grossly unfair. As many officers say, “di bale, snappy, shabby, the same
salary at napro-promote din naman?
It is unfortunate indeed that President Arroyo seems to have lost sight of
the fact that military reform must still be a priority in the quest for good
government or a Strong Republic. Indeed, AFP reform has disappeared from the
President’s radar screen as she continues to patronize the generals. I
surmise two reasons for this: First, she needs the help of the AFP to keep
the numerous security problems in check--Abu Sayaff, MILF, communist
insurgency--and to maintain a semblance of order and authority as she deals
with a rather unstable political set-up. Second, there is the debt of
gratitude for the AFP’s pivotal role in EDSA 2 when the defection of the
chain of command turned the tide against Erap and propelled GMA to the
presidency. She may not want to antagonize the military right now or she
will be looked upon as “walang utang na loob? and risk losing the AFP’s
support.
There is no doubt that GMA’s most urgent concern is the economy but her
success in economics depends on how she can successfully deal with security
problems. Political stability and peace and order underpins her success in
reviving an ailing economy, building investor confidence, stabilizing
exchange rate fluctuations and creating a positive business climate.
Insistence on military reforms at this time may not be a pragmatic
proposition when the country is still recovering and her administration is
still gaining a foothold. Indeed, the military, which played a crucial role
in her ascent, will also play a crucial role in her survival.
What are the areas for reform?
I believe there are two general areas which should be addressed for reform:
unprofessionalism and corruption. I refer to unprofessionalism as those
practices that undermine the three elements of the military profession as
explained by Samuel Huntington: expertise, responsibility and corporateness.
In other words, those decisions and/or actions that result in weakening or
destroying the manner with which the soldier can optimally perform his duty
within a framework of integrity and camaraderie or teamwork. Examples are
poor leadership skills, indecisiveness and
poor decision making, tactical and technical incompetence, poor language and
communication skills, favoritism and nepotism, ticket-punching, inexperience
or lack of combat experience, promotions and appointments not based on merit
but on palaksasan and bata-bata system, extracting personal services from
soldiers and also criminal activities such as the blackmarketing scandal in
East Timor, human rights abuses or engaging in the drug trade or arms
smuggling. Stretching it further, it also includes attitudes in the Officer
Corps today like “Wait till you become? “Go with the flow? “If you cannot
beat them, join them?
The other area is corruption or in its more subtle description, unethical
conduct. Like any government agency, the AFP has its own share of the
“normal?graft and corrupt practices such as commissions, kickbacks,
overpricing, padding, substitution and ghost deliveries. This is common
knowledge among suppliers, dealers, auditors, supply officers and NCOs,
Supply Accountable Officers ?practically everyone involved in the supply and
finance chain. However, the AFP is involved in a far more sophisticated form
of corruption that is jokingly called as the “mother?of all corruption in
the AFP. This is the practice called “conversion? What is conversion and why
is it unethical?
In an essay in the Army Journal in 1997, I defined conversion as ?the
process of converting procurements to its cash equivalent? Col. Ricardo
Morales, a fellow advocate for AFP reform, describes it in his essay in the
same magazine in 2001: “if an amount is originally intended for office
supplies but is instead spent for construction materials, this amount has to
be ‘converted?so that government accounting and auditing requirements are
satisfied? In the process of conversion, either from one expense item to
another or to outright cash, a certain percentage is skimmed off the top
which goes to everyone in the signature chain. Some call this rather
strangely as the “cost of money? Rates of 25% or higher are normal but the
dealer actually only gets somewhere between 9-16% as the rest goes to
“approving and auditing authorities?
Obviously, there are benefits and downsides to the conversion process. One
dvantage is that it gets things done as government accounting and auditing
procedures are very stringent and one cannot buy a computer (which perhaps
you need most) using your excess allocated funds for office supplies (paper,
pens and the like). In the field, a commander can get cash which is very
liquid and use it for civil-military operations projects (buy medicines, a
goat for pulutan with village officials, batteries for radioes, food for
visitors at headquarters, etc.)
On the other hand, I see six major downsides to conversion:
1) First, it is illegal as it violates the AFP Procurement System. Chapter
1, para 1-3 section D of the AFP Procurement Manual states, “Conversion of
any kind must not be resorted to? Conversion also violates COA Circular
81-09 regulating the conduct of inspections (converted items are falsely
declared). Further, failure to follow the correct procurement process
renders a government official criminally liable under Republic Act 3019: The
Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act for “grave misconduct, dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service?
2) Second, it is subject to misuse and abuse in the hands of the
unscrupulous. As on record, converted funds are “cleared? commanding
officers can use them practically for any purpose desired to include
personal expenses, allowances, travel “pabaon? buy a house and car, pay
personal credit card bills, night-clubbing and philandering purposes.
3) Third, since items bought through converted funds are evidences of an
unethical act, they are not entered into the property book. I have heard of
offices buying laptops every time a new boss comes in because they were
taken away by the previous occupants.
4) Fourth, conversion is essentially inefficient as the “cost of money? does
not maximize the use of that resource. Projects than need conversion must
always the 25% on top of the projected actual expenditure. It also distorts
the planning and budget process as the budget does not in reality reflect
actual expenditures and these actual expenditures are not properly recorded.
5) Conversion and the attendant abuses that go with it leads to
demoralization as a result of the inequities in income and lifestyle. The
lifestyle of officers and soldiers receiving allowances are very different
from those who rely on their salaries alone. The Captain who rides a jeepney
and sees a fellow Captain drive a nice car, even if second hand, feels not
only inadequacy but also resentment.
6) And the biggest downside of all is the adverse effect of conversion on
the professional ethics of the officers and soldiers who have to resort to
it to cover operational requirements and achieve the mission. It is a
serious violation of the Officer Code that “An Officer does not lie, cheat,
steal nor tolerate those who do? It slowly and very subtly erodes the moral
fibers of soldiers involved in it. It is an anathema to the ethical and
professional development of an officer.
In many cases, a unit commander cannot be blamed for converting his funds.
Operations dictate a different set of requirements but the budget allocated
is in different accounting class. Coupled with stringent government
accounting and auditing rules plus the presence of unscrupulous dealers and
auditors, conversion becomes a necessary evil. In a way, conversion then
becomes essential to accomplishing the mission. Conversion is hence both a
solution and a problem but considering its downsides, it is more of a
problem that must be resolved. There must be a way to first control the use
of conversion and to audit the moneys and properties that result from it.
Ultimately, it should be eliminated and replaced with a system that promotes
transparency and accountability. It will take concerted government action to
solve this matter as this will require changes in government financial
procedures and actions in both legislative and executive branches.
Is Rebuilding the Armed Forces possible?
I have experienced attempting to reform the Armed Forces in both ways: the
violent way with involvement in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts and the
peaceful way through the “Rizal? way of writing about and advocating
military reforms. The failures of the 1987 and 1989 coup are well reported.
But for the peaceful way, I figured if it cannot be done through the power
of the sword, I can advocate reform through the power of the pen. So I
wrote, wrote and wrote ?in magazines, in letters to the editor, in research
papers, even letters to our lawmakers. When I was editor of the Army
Journal, I envisioned it to be a “forum for professional issues?and not just
the sounding board or photo album for the generals. We started publishing
essays critical of Army systems and for a while, got away with it. But
today, I do not see the same fire as the essays are either benign or merely
historical. It has not really become as ?an agent of progressive ideas and
constructive change…to create a progressive-minded Officer Corps and a
professional Army? I did a similar approach with the Cavalier magazine of
the Philippine Military Academy and for a while got away with it as well
until I resigned after writing a stinging editorial mocking the PMA motto
entitled, “Courage, Integrity, Loyalty, Yeh Right!?
Thus, if my experience is any indication, the chain of command is apathetic
to the soundings of reform. No amount of coups (we’ve had 9 in the last 17
years as stated in one newspaper), Davide Comissions and the life,
Congressional Hearings (we have a yearly budget hearing) and millions of
pages written on military reform have really made a difference. In fact,
many of the abhorrent practices have become so entrenched that it will be
difficult to entangle the Gordian knot. Yes, there is a grievance system in
the Armed Forces but it does not work as it ought to be. Legitimate
complaints and constructive criticisms are clamped down by the chain of
command as insubordination or dissent and worse, telltales of rebellion in
the ranks. Official proclamations on reform and professionalism have been
mere lip service and unethical conduct is openly tolerated and even
encouraged. No senior officer has been caught or punished for financial
misdealings or wrongdoing. It has become a never-ending cycle of abuse and
corruption to which there is seemingly no end, from one Chief of Staff to
another, one Commander in Chief to the next. Indeed, anyone advocating
reform in the AFP is a voice in the wilderness and the frustration of the
Magdalo group when it comes to the chain of command not really listening is
understandable, but not their action at Oakwood.
Despite the difficulties, both foreseen and unforessen and perhaps, a few
death threats, I believe that with political will, moral courage and the
right management, rebuilding the professionalism and integrity of the Armed
Forces is possible. Yes, it will indeed be difficult but it is not
altogether hopeless. As many always say, it will not be overnight but we
have to start sometime, somehow. As the Chinese say, “the journey of a
thousand miles begins with a single step? Contrary to what many say that
unprofessionalism and corruption is an ethical problem or an attitude
problem, I say that it is merely a management problem and can be controlled
and neutralized. Military reform should be approached as if it was a change
management project in a business organization with clear objectives,
systematic processes and well-structured, motivated teams with good leaders.
Performance, transparency and efficiency shall be the name of the game.
Indeed, where management voids are glaring, unprofessionalism and corruption
follows.
I know that it can be done as it has been repeatedly in many business
organizations. What is lacking here is the political resolve and moral
courage to take action and face the risks. I have been involved in change
programs in the companies that I have been in and yes, it will be difficult
and it will involve lots of work and sacrifice on the part of the leaders.
Top management commitment, support and example are very important
ingredients, things that I believe are absent in military reform actions in
the past and until now. Management turnover is quick (look at the number of
CSAFP in less than year) thus there is no consistency. There is also no real
motivation on management to be committed to change or reform as fixing
conversion, for example, is a threat to personal economic interests. The
lack of competence among officers to drive changes is also another factor.
But there are well-meaning, competent and quick-learning officers who can
lead and direct a reform campaign without a rebellion.
Military reform will not come easy and will come with great risks to the
Arroyo administration or to any administration -- risks that the President
may not be willing to take in a politically unstable environment. It will be
an uphill battle against former generals who will be offended when human
rights abuses and corrupt financial transactions are exposed. Likewise,
there will be resistance from those whose careers and economic interests
will be threatened -- unscrupulous defense officials, senior officers,
politicians and influential suppliers. It will be difficult because the very
generals and colonels now running the system benefited or is benefiting from
it. By admitting that the system is defective puts into question their own
rise in the ranks and their positions. It is like cutting off your own arm.
As for conversion, why kill the
goose that lays the golden egg?
Who are Responsible for AFP Reform?
There is a saying in the military, “The Commander is responsible for
everything that the unit does or fails to do? The ranks of the commanders
come from the Office Corps and I dare day that the present state of
unprofessionalism and corruption in the defense and military establishment
is a failure in leadership of the Officer Corps. Clearly, the fault and the
responsibility lies in the officers and their collective failure to build a
truly professional military. It is in the Officer Corps that the solution
lies. Laws and procedures alone will not solve the issue of
unprofessionalism and corruption. What is required is a dedicated pool of
leaders and managers who shall not only implement the rules and regulations
but also set the example. This is the job of the officers who are the
leaders and managers of the Armed Forces. Indeed, the future of the Armed
Forces, whether it improves or regresses, is in the hands of the Officer
Corps.
One reason I resigned from the military service was because I felt that the
professional milieu in the AFP was no longer acceptable to my sense of
integrity. Looking back, there was nothing faulty with the AFP as an
organization. The fault-line lay deeper--in its leaders. The ultimate reason
for the AFP’s failure as an institution to uphold the virtues of the
profession of arms lies in the Officer Corps. The unprofessionalism and
corruption in the AFP today are merely reflective of the professional and
moral bankruptcy of the Officer Corps. At the core of professionalism and
reform is the integrity of the Officer Corps--from the Lieutenant to the
General, from the platoon leader to the Chief of Staff. The Martial Law
years disoriented the values of the Officer Corps and many of that era’s
attitude and practices remain today. Over the years, as a result of
government neglect and public apathy, officers have been accustomed to
unethical practices as a way of getting around a rigid system in order to
provide for legitimate operational requirements. In the hands of
unscrupulous officers, these practices are abused for personal gain and
power.
What is intriguing is that the AFP senior staff are mostly Peemayers and in
large measure, Peemayers must share the blame and the responsibility for the
present state of unprofessionalism and corruption in the Armed Forces (and
the Philippine National Police). The despicable state of the Officer Corps
today is, for the most part, the result of action and/or inaction of
Peemayers who have failed to live up to the Academy motto of Courage,
Integrity, Loyalty, who have chosen the easier wrong to the harder right.
Indeed, PMA has been successful in churning out officers for a progressive
(and lucrative) military career but it has utterly failed in imbuing the
officers with character and integrity.
Reforming the military will be difficult but it is not hopeless for so long
as there will be officers and men who try to live up to the ideals. As the
Marines say, “we need a few good men? That is one essential role of the
Philippine Military Academy, to be able to mold cadets who will one day
become officers imbued with a sense of courage, both physical and moral,
integrity and professionalism. The hope for reform in the Armed Forces
resides in the junior officers of today who unfortunately are slowly being
corrupted and eaten up by the existing unprofessional and unethical system.
How to shield these junior officers from the rotten acts of their superiors
and promote professional ethics in their ranks as they rise in their
military career is going to be a serious challenge and is a must if we are
to build a professional and honest Officer Corps for the Armed Forces.
Clearly, a professional and honest Officer Corps means a professional and
honest Armed Forces.
Thus, today, given the overall quality of the Officer Corps and the top
chain of command, I have serious doubts whether the Armed Forces of the
Philippines can police its own self and reform from within. Necessarily, due
to the hierarchical structure of the AFP, a peaceful and relatively quicker
reform campaign must start from the top. The approach must be top-down and
not bottom-up. Inputs from the bottom must, however, be generated and buy-in
created to ensure an effective reform process. I believe that today, the
civil sector should play a role in the reformation of the military by way of
pressure, by keeping the reform process alive, by opening up issues and
concerns to the public. Moreover, the role of Congress is also essential as
reforming the AFP will require the enactment of laws or the review of
existing laws governing the military and defense. Perhaps, Congressional
inquiries “in aid of legislation? can be more forthright and sincere in
opening up and publicly discussing sensitive professional and ethical
matters (such as conversion and political intervention in promotions and
assignments). But more than the Legislative, it is the Executive branch that
should initiate the reform process as the President is the Commander in
Chief and therefore holds ultimate command responsibility for the Armed
Forces. How the President plays the reform card will dictate the intensity
and tempo of reform. In the end, the failure to reform the AFP is the
failure of the Commander in Chief.
A Brief Word on the Magdalo Group Mutiny
I recall my experiences in 1987 and 1989 and I cannot help but see myself
last weekend in the soldiers at Oakwood. Whether they were used or
manipulated is the subject of an investigation and I will not dwell into
that. What I would like to say though it that in the young officers mind, I
surmise a messianic complex compounded by a sense of adventurism and
misguided idealism. A major factor in the creation of this mindset is the
politicization of the soldiers in the field where they are exposed to the
inadequacies of the government and the Armed Forces. In trying to accomplish
their mission of “wining the hearts and minds?of remote barangays, soldiers
become involved in the life of the communities in their areas of
responsibility. In many cases, they take over government responsibilities
where they are lacking in the form of medical and dental civacs, education
programs and other organizing and development projects.
Then after experiencing the hardships in their detachments, they visit Camp
Aguinaldo or Fort Bonifacio and they see a glaring inequity in lifestyle.
While they are “rotting?in the field, their senior officers are “enjoying?in
the camps. While they find it difficult to source funds to fix their jeeps
and trucks in the mountains, majors and colonels drive around in nice cars
in Metro Manila. While they receive their meager salary, they find that
their comrades and mistahs are getting unauthorized allowances double or
triple their basic salaries. Frustration sets in and the barrel of the gun,
and the inherent sense of power that comes with it, becomes a way to release
that frustration. That frustration and idealism can be manipulated by
scrupulous people who will use it for their own ends. It is sad to see such
promising officers go to waste.
Conclusion
Having been an officer, I continue to feel responsible for the dismal state
of the AFP today. Call it the Zygernik effect, an anxiety over unfinished
business. Thus, I continue to advocate for military reform as I cannot
accept the present state of the Armed Forces despite the rosy rhetoric from
the generals about a “reformed?AFP. The cries and gripes of the Magdalo
group say otherwise. And there are thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen
who are mute witnesses to the unprofessionalism and corruption in the AFP,
unprofessionalism and corruption that continues to fuel discontent and
frustration among the officers and enlisted personnel. The threat of a coup
or a mutiny can only be neutralized if we reform the AFP for it to be a
responsible and honest organization led by a professional Officer Corps.
Why I continue to advocate military reform despite the seeming
impossibilities? A parable which appeared in the Army Journal in June 1994
is, I believe, an appropriate answer (please forgive the religious
undertones):
A long time ago, a philosopher went to a city to save its people from their
sins and tell them the good news. At first, people listened to him but
gradually, they turned away. However, the philosopher continued to preach
and this time, even louder. People did not understand and asked themselves
“Why does he go on? Does he not see that his mission is hopeless? Then, one
day, a curious child asked the wise man why he went on and on. The
philosopher calmly replied, “In the beginning, I thought I could change
them. If I still shout, it is only to prevent them from changing me?
________________________________
About
the Author:
Rene N.
Jarque is a former Philippine Army officer who served as Special Assistant
to the Secretary of National Defense for defense policy and strategy. He was
Chief of Strategic Research of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies,
AFP. In the Philippine Army, he served in various command and staff
positions with the First Scout Ranger Regiment, 5th
Infantry Division and Psychological Operations Group. He is
Infantry, Scout Ranger, Airborne and PSY-OPS qualified and has received
numerous awards and decorations for gallantry in combat, including for
wounds in battle, and for effective leadership and unit management. He was a
lecturer in AFP schools and was editor of the
Army
Journal, Cavalier, OSS Digest
and
OSS Research Series.
His essays and commentaries have appeared in many publications notably,
Politik, Newsbreak, The Philippine Star, Philippine Daily
Inquirer,
among others. He left the military service in 1998 as a Captain and has been
working abroad as an executive since then. He briefly came back to the
Philippines in 2003 and was involved with various cause-oriented works
advocating AFP reform and good governance. He is a graduate of the United
States Military Academy, West Point, class of 1986 and has an MBA from the
Ateneo Graduate School of Business.
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