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================= ================= ================= ================= ================= ================= ================= Restiveness Redux Angling for Support ================= ================= ================= Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook ================= |
Withdrawal of Support The Fall of Joseph Estrada, The Inside Story Interviews with General Angelo Reyes on February 13 & 24, 2001 Amando Doronila, Anvil Publishing and Inquirer, 2001
1. Reyes : …So we’ll withdraw support, we’ll assemble at the conference room. I’ll call the board of generals… They’ll see me in my office. We will withdraw support and we will announce it... When you do this thing, you do it swiftly, quickly, (so there is) no chance for failure*...
...To meet her, we go to the Corinthian at 2 o’clock then go to EDSA at 3 p.m... I said I had to dress up, go to the office so things look normal*... when we were still meeting at 10 o’clock I got a call that Secretary Mercado wanted to meet me in his office at 11:30. I said I can’t meet him at that time. It came to my mind that it was possible that he already knew that we were doing something*…
Doronila: Why did you have to have a safe house? Why not in the camp?
Reyes: It’s not good to do this there. They know exactly where you are and I was going to meet with the vice-president and we have to do it very, very quietly*. (p. 297)
2. Macapagal-Arroyo had an inkling on Thursday evening that Reyes was ready to cross over. Alvez told her that Reyes was willing to talk.
The talks were set for 2 p.m. on Friday. But Reyes moved the meeting forward, at 12 noon, because he thought the president had been tipped off about his plan to defect...
…She... did not tell Aquino and Sin she was meeting Reyes at the Corinthian safe house because the general had requested secrecy* until he had talked to President Estrada. (p. 203)
3. Within two hours of the decision to withdraw, the Armed Forces all over the country were electrified and galvanized behind the chain of command. With the battle orders issued, Reyes, together with Alvez and his staff, drove to the Corinthian safe house for the rendezvous with Macapagal-Arroyo.* (p. 204)
4. ...In their meeting, Reyes told her, “Ma’am, we are going to announce our withdrawal of support from the president and give it to you.”* (p. 171)
... and she said OK. (p. 297) 5. REYES MADE THE DECISION to withdraw at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, after a meeting with his staff. He informed the vice-president of the decision... at 11:45 a.m. Reyes called the board of generals - composed of the three major services commanders, the vice-chief of staff and the deputy chief-of-staff - to the safe house to inform them of his decision...
... After securing the support of everyone inside the staff room, Reyes said (“In jest,” according to him): “Gentlemen, I’m sure you know that we’ve just committed mutiny* **.” His staff said, “Yes, sir.” (page 171)
6. ...Reyes told the generals of his decision... He said, “it would be ideal for the AFP to announce the withdrawal of support with one voice.”*... (p. 172)
...After securing the support of the board of generals, Reyes invited the vice-president to join them at the dining room. There he introduced her to the generals as their new commander-in-chief *.... (p. 173)
7. Reyes:... She met me at about 12 noon. We waited for the vice-president. She came and then we talked. I said we are giving our support to her as the constitutionally mandated successor and she said OK... After that, we had the major service commanders picked up and then brought to the safe house. I met and discussed it with them and then they all agreed to join so it was complete.* After that I called up the president. We talked for about 45 minutes...
... At 11:30 when I was at the office, through my aide, (I got a) message from the president “you report to Malacanang immediately.” I said they know already so I said I will not go there anymore*... (p. 297)
8. At 4:30 P.M. ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 19, 2001, the Military high command, led by Gen. Angelo Reyes, chief of staff of the Armed Forces, walked up the stage of the EDSA shrine, where leaders of the civil uprising were assembled, and declared the withdrawal of their support from President Estrada.*
“On behalf of the 113,000-strong Armed Forces of the Philippines, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support from the incumbent president.* We will support his constitutionally mandated successor under Article 2, Section 3, of the Constitution***... the AFP must protect the people and the State.”
With these words, Reyes transferred the Armed Forces’ allegiance to Estrada’s constitutional successor,* Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In a demonstration of the solidarity of the military chain of command,* Reyes brought with him to EDSA Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado; Lt. Gen. Diomedio Villanueva, the Army commander; Lt. Gen. Benjamin Defensor, the Air Force commander; Rear Admiral Guillermo Wong, the Navy commander; and Lt. Gen. Jaime de los Santos, the deputy chief of staff. ...The vice-chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Jose Calimlim, was a late defector... (page 168-169)
9. ... Reyes announced his decision and asked them if they were with him. He started with General Villanueva, the Army Commander, who headed the most powerful command in the Armed Forces. Reyes himself had been Army commander. A source said Reyes started with Villanueva because he knew he had Villanueva’s support, having spoken with him before - “kasi alam nya na.... Nakapag-usap na sila.” Sure enough, Villanueva openly supported Reyes’ decision.
Next, Reyes turned to Admiral Wong to ask if he was with him: “Ikaw, kasama ka ba?” The admiral hesitated, but later said “yes.” A senior officer in the Navy had another version. According to him, Reyes, after noting Wong’s hesitation, told the Navy chief, “That is my decision.”
Apparently robbed of the initiative,* according to witnesses, the other generals, when asked themselves, just went along. “Tuloy, tuloy na. Naunahan na sila ni Angie,”* the witnesses said.
Before the headcount, Reyes had seen to it that he had the support of the units in the field under the command of the service chiefs,* inside sources said. If they had not fallen in line, said the sources, “they would have been generals without an army. We already talked to their men...not to make a move.”*
...Some commanders asked what to do with the orders for them to report to Malacanang. Reyes asserted his authority and said: “Don’t make a move, stay where you are.”*
... I ordered them to shut off their cellular phones to avoid further calls from Malacanang palace*...(p. 172)
10. Reyes: They started to call up the generals. They called up the Generals, Malacanang... They called those two guys, Ladia and Camiling. They said, “Sir, I’m being asked to report to Malacanang. What will I do?” I said you do not go there. You stay put*...(p. 298)
11. ...On January 18, General Reyes appeared to have learned about the troop movements. He rang Espinosa, teasing him about his plans*...(p. 183)
12. Although Abat had discussed the broad outlines of the retired generals’ plans with Reyes*... there is no evidence he reported these to the president or sought their arrest for sedition*...(p. 190)
13. Abadia joined the camp of Vice President Macapagal-Arroyo in October, and found General de Villa there. Abadia resumed contact with the Army commander, General Villanueva, an ally of General Reyes...* He also told Villanueva he would be talking with some of his generals and unit commanders, a move Villanueva did not block.* (p. 191)
14. ...Reyes says: “The members of the battle staff at the AFP joint operations center relayed my orders to all field commanders to keep their forces inside their respective camps and to all intelligence units to monitor any unauthorized troop movements.* After they were advised to await any further instructions from me, I ordered them to shut off their cellular phones to avoid further calls from Malacañang palace and to communicate through the AFP radio network instead.”* (pp. 172-173)
15. ...Lacson admitted an “intelligence failure,”* which he thought unforgivable in the face of newspaper reports of unrest inside the military and police... (p. 175)
16. THEIR PLAN, ACCORDING TO EBDANE, was to secure the vice-president in situations based on three scenarios: conviction of Estrada, resignation or acquittal... Ebdane, through General Abu and General Santiago, informed General Reyes about their plan*... (p. 179)
17. Although Abat had discussed the broad outlines of the retired generals’ plans with Reyes... there is no evidence he reported these to the president or sought their arrest for sedition.* (p. 190)
18. ...Abat said, “So long as we were doing our work above ground and they were doing their job silently underground, we did not meddle with each other.” Abat was referring to the high-profile activity of the retired generals and to the contacts between General Reyes and retired Gen. Leo Alvez,* Reyes’ classmate at the PMA who was in charge of security for prosecution witnesses in the impeachment trial and himself working on Reyes. (p. 191)
19. ...On Thursday morning, an excited Colonel Corpus rushed into Reyes’ office to say that the situation was “about to explode.” Corpus was apparently putting pressure on Reyes to make a move. Reyes was not stampeded by Corpus’ alarming report. “If you do not move, sir, you might find me on the other side,” Corpus said. “Go ahead. Go to the other side,* if that’s what you believe in,” replied Reyes.(p. 201)
20. If I may fast forward a little in EDSA 2, we did not start anything. The people started it, they sustained it. We did not plot it. We just finished it*... (pp. 294)
21. ...According to Colonel Corpus, sometime in December, ... Reyes consulted Raul Pangalanan, dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law, for legal advice on the question of the constitutional role of the Armed Foces...
...Pangalanan... expressed reservations that any means of removing Estrada other than resignation or impeachment would be “stretching the text of the Constitution.” As dean of the UP College of Law, Pangalanan had taken the position that the “proper procedure” was impeachment or resignation, and any other procedure was a “constitutional shortcut.”... (p. 197)
22. Reyes emphasized that he never plotted against the government. “We are prepared to thwart any attempt at unconstitutional stepping down or power grab from any sector – from the Left, from the Right, anywhere,” he said. “I have said that we are a constitutional Armed Forces and we will remain that way against anybody.”... (p. 194)
23. Reyes and Ortiz sat at breakfast for three hours, and Reyes revealed snatches of the conversation.
Ortiz said: “I could arrange a meeting between you and Gloria.”
Reyes said : “Why should I meet Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? I don’t want to meet her.”
“If I agreed to meet her then,” Reyes now said during the interview, “that could easily be misconstrued as participating in a conspiracy – or committing treachery – against President Estrada.”
...Reyes told him, “…the chief-of-staff should never even be perceived as plotting against any government – much less, actually doing so.”... (p. 194)
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